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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR AJUSTMENTS
BY INTERSTATE COMPACTS
FRANCIS C. WILSON*
T HE educational value of local self-government to train citizens to
assume the larger responsibilities of the administration of state
and nation was fully comprehended by the statesmen of revolutionary
times. The well-nigh universal participation of the people in county,
township, city and village government was treasured as the badge of a
free citizenry. Out of that schooling emerged an understanding widely
diffused of the functions of representative government in broader fields.
Thus, there was constant resistance to the conception of a central
authority with powers so extensive and far-reaching as to constitute
conceivably a threat to the full exercise of those primary political
rights. The Articles of Confederation reflected that distrust.
When the Constitutional Convention convened the situation afforded
opportunity to the advocates of an all powerful central government to
press that view with particular force. Patriotism and statesmanship,
however, triumphed over individual convictions, prejudices, and sec-
tional differences. Opposing philosophies of government compromised
upon the plan as finally adopted. But the purpose to preserve home rule
in local and state affairs in so far as the principle could be retained
compatible with a strong and efficient central government, was written
into the Constitution in unmistakable language.
The conflict of opposing views has persisted from that day to this.
But without embracing either side of the controversy, we may accept
as established law that Congress cannot pass laws regulating the hours
of labor, the minimum wage, child labor, conditions of production, em-
ployment and work, in industries and commerce wholly intrastate,
which only indirectly affect interstate commerce. To that extent at least,
the purpose of the constitution makers to preserve home rule over local
affairs remains, argument is at rest, and the barrier beyond which fed-
eral authority cannot pass is established. The Constitution so provides.'
Yet we are not thereby rid of the division of opinion. Current agita-
tion urges, by an amendment to the Constitution, the transfer of the
police powers of the states over such subjects to the federal govern-
ment. The public mind is confused by arguments obscured by violent
partisanship. Surely at this juncture it is the part of statesmanship to
examine our organic law with a view to determining whether the wis-
*This paper was read at a meeting of the Wisconsin Bar Association at
Milwaukee, November 20, 1935.
3A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation, et al. v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct.
837, 79 L.ed. 888 (1935).
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dom of its framers provides a way for efficient action without destruc-
tion of state sovereignty, and home rule.
THE COMPACT CLAUSE
It is important, for a moment, to review, briefly, the situation of
the states at the date of the Constitutional Convention. They had won
their independence from the mother country. Each was a sovereign
nation with all the powers inherent in the sovereignty of any nation.
Individually lacking in material resources and in man power adequate
for defense, they feared the aggressions of foreign nations and desired
the strength which linion would afford. Their initial attempt at such a
union as expressed by the Articles of Confederation had not been a
happy one.
The people were jealous of the freedom they had so hardly won
for themselves, and the independence they had achieved for their re-
spective states, yet they were willing to surrender much to attain rela-
tive security. So it came about that they abandoned their first effort
and established a federal government with greatly increased powers,
delegating to it control over international questions, war and peace,
treaty-making, regulation of commerce between the states and with
foreign nations, coinage and the establishment of monetary standards,
and other matters, which in common affected all the states. To confirm
those powers and to make them as effectual as possible, the people
barred the states by express prohibitions from exercising any of the
sovereign powers which they had delegated to the central government
thus created, but by the compact clause: "No State shall, without the
consent of Congress * * * enter into any agreement or compact with
another state, or with a foreign nation * * * ;,,2 the people declared that
when Congress consented, the sovereign powers with respect to treaty-
making which the states had enjoyed as independent nations should
become theirs as in their former right with respect to matters within
their reserved powers.3 It follows that in the construction of a compact
2 U S. CONST. Art. I, § 10. "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or con-
federation * * * "
3 Poole et al. v. The Lessee of John Fleeger et al., 11 Pet. 185, 9 L.ed. 680(1837) (boundary compact between Tennessee and Kentucky) ; Green et al. v.
Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L.ed. 547 (1823) (compact between Virginia and Ken-
tucky) ; The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations v. The Com-
mon'wealth of Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L.ed. 1233 (1838) (involving agree-
ments as to boundaries and subsequent possession by Massachusetts) ; see The
State of Rhode Island v. the State of Massachusetts, 4 How. 591, 11 L.ed. 1116(1846) ; Lessee of Joseph Marlatt v. John Silk and John M'Donald, 11 Pet. 1,
9 L.ed. 609 (1837).
For the purposes of this paper the word "Compact" will be used inter-
changeably with the word "Treaty." A famous writer defines a treaty as, "A
compact made with a view to the public welfare, by the superior power, either
for perpetuity, or for a considerable time." VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (new
ed by Chitty, 1859) 287. But see STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,
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between states made with the consent of Congress4 international law
will be applied and as in the case of treaties between sovereign nations,
§ 1402, 1403, 1404, where a distinction is made in the use of the word "treaty"
in clause 1 and the word "compact" in clause 2, U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10.
Usurpation by the states of the treaty-making power delegated to the
United States is guarded against by the censorship over their agreements with
other states or with foreign nations vested in Congress. But there are recog-
nized limits to the treaty-making power delegated to the United States arising
of necessity from the nature of our institutions as established by the Consti-
tution. Thus, "A treaty which undertook to take away what the Constitution
secured, or to enlarge the federal jurisdiction would be void." Downes v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 244, 312, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L.ed. 1088 (1900).a Any contention
to the effect that the delegation of the treaty making power included the right
by treaty to destroy the reserved powers of the states, amounts to a conclusion
that the tenth amendment is a nullity when in conflict with the delegated power
of treaty making, that the people in establishing the Union had created a
Frankenstein with power to destroy the sovereignty of the states which they
had decreed should be preserved. There is a lack of harmony in that con-
tention with expressions of the Supreme Court upon the subject, and with the
logic of accepted rules of construction,b which admits of the conclusion that
the treaty making power delegated to the United States is limited at least to
the extent that it cannot be exercised to annul the police powers of the
states.c
As regards negotiations with foreign nations for uniform international
commercial and labor legislation, limitations on the federal power have long
been recognized. (See Report of the Committee on Interstate Compacts to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, August 1921,
pp. 26 to 33, commonly known as "Wignore's Report.") Since the reserved
powers of the states comprehend such subjects it is a field upon which the
United States has been disinclined to trespass. VATTEL, op. cit. supra, § 206
says, "The public compacts called conventions, articles of agreement, etc.,
when they are made between sovereigns, differ from treaties only in their
object." What then is the distinction in clause 1 and clause 2, (U. S. CoNST.
Art. I, § 10) in the use of the words "treaty" and "compacts"? The first refers
to the treaty powers of the United States of America, the second defines the
treaty powers of the states. Both words describe the same attribute of sov-
ereignty, but each has limitations expressed in, or implied from the nature of,
the instrument in which they are used.
a See TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER (1915) chap-
ter X and cases therein cited; contra, Corwin, The Treaty-Making Power,
THE NORTH AmERICAN REVIEW, June, 1914; I WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed. 1929) 561; address by Senator Elihu
Root before the American Society of International Law, April 19, 1907.
b In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 312, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L.ed. 1088
(1900), Justice White said, "It is conceded at once that the true rule of
construction is not to accept one provision of the Constitution alone but to
contemplate all and therefore to limit one conceded attribute by those
qualifications which naturally result from the other powers granted by
that instrument, so that the whole may be interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth."
c In State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L.ed. 641
(1920), The Migratory Bird Treaty with Great Britain was held to be
supreme and paramount to state laws on the subject which admittedly the
states were not competent to act upon because of the nature of the problem,
but the Court said, "We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifica-
tions to the treaty-making power."
4Such consent may be given before or after the compact has been agreed upon,
or may be implied. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728, 37
L.ed. 537 (1893) (compact of 1803) ; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39,
20 L.ed. 67 (1871); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 Sup. Ct. 783, 38 L.ed.
669 (1894). Under certain conditions the consent of Congress is not required.
See Virginia v. Tennessee, supra; The State of Florida v. The State of
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they are obligatory upon the citizens thereof and bind their rights.5 We
may conclude that upon any subject involving mutual concern for the
welfare of their people calling for the exercise of their police powers,
the states may agree, with the consent of Congress, and in some in-
stances, perhaps, without it,6 with the same force and effect as any
nation in dealing with other nations could in the enjoyment of complete
sovereignty.7
Before the Constitution and since its adoption, the treaty power of
the states has been frequently invoked for the adjustment of a variety
of controversies between them and for the prosecution of joint ven-
tures.8 Disputed boundaries have been settled, the water supply of inter-
state rivers has been apportioned, jurisdiction over boundary waters
agreed upon, rights of fishery adjusted and protected, comprehensive
development of interstate harbors and rivers undertaken, cession of
territory by one state to another accomplished, construction of improve-
ments involving the use of territory within two or more states has been
authorized and completed, and within the year, an oil and gas conserva-
tion agreement has been reached, consented to by Congress and ac-
cepted by seven of the largest producing states, all by means of agree-
ments between the states. What one state can do singly, it can do jointly
with another by the adoption of appropriate measures sanctioned by
Congress.
Georgia, 17 How. 478, 494, 15 L.ed. 181, 190 (1854); Dover v. Portsmouth
Bridge, 17 N.H. 200 (1845); Fischer v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882(1887) ; Union Branch R. Co. v. East Tenn. & Ga. R. Co., 14 Ga. 327 (1853);
cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 10 L.ed. 579 (1840).
5 For cases so holding in effect see Note 4, supra.
6 See note 4, supra.
7 In Poole et al. v. The Lessee of John Fleeger et al., 11 Pet. 185, 209, 9 L.ed.
680 (1837), Mr. Justice Story, for the Court, said, "We are of the opinion
that the instruction given by the court below is entirely correct. It cannot be
doubted that it is a part of the general right of sovereignty belonging to inde-
pendent nations to establish and fix the disputed boundaries between their
respective territories, and the boundaries so established and fixed by compact
between nations become conclusive upon all the subjects and citizens thereof,
and bind their rights; and are to be so treated, to all intents and purposes, as
the true and real boundaries. This is a doctrine universally recognized in the
lav and practice of nations. It is a right equally belonging to the states of this
Union, unless it has been surrendered under the Constitution of the United
States. So far from there being any pretense of such a general surrender of
the right, it is expressly recognized by the Constitution, and guarded in its
exercise by a single limitation or restriction, requiring the consent of Congress.
The Constitution declares that, 'No state shall, without the consent of Con-
gress, enter into any agreement or compact with another state;' thus plainly
admitting that, with such consent, it might be done; and in the present in-
stance, that consent has been expressly given. The compact, then, has full
validity, and all the 'terms and conditions of it must be equally obligatory
upon the citizens of both states'." See The State of Rhode Island and the
Providence Plantations v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9
L.ed. 1233 (1838).
8 Ely, Oil Conservation through Interstate Agreement (1933), Federal Oil Con-
servation Board.
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TREATY MAKING By THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND By THE STATES COMPARED
As we have already observed, if the consent of Congress is given,
the treaty-making power of the states is reinvested with respect to their
reserved powers as fully as it existed when independence was
achieved.9 As an expression of their treaty powers prior to the Consti-
tution, the Articles of Confederation represent the major exemplifica-
tion. By that instrument they surrendered to the Congress of the
United States a considerable measure of their sovereignty. Ratification
(March 1781) was by the state legislatures acting by agents empowered
for that purpose. The compact was in fact, therefore, a treaty of al-
liance between thirteen independent states authorized by their respec-
tive legislatures acting in that regard for each state as the treaty mak-
ing sovereign of that state.' 0 Elected by the people, they acted for the
people in lieu of king, emperor, or czar. Such authority, although un-
usual, was the natural outcome of the distrust the people of the colonies
felt for rulers and "governors."
An act of the legislature of a state ratifying a compact is a law
with the force and effect of any law, but above and beyond that aspect
it is an exercise of the sovereign power of the state to enter into a con-
tract with another state for the common purposes defined in the
treaty." The legislature, then, functions in a dual capacity, i.e., first, it
is the sovereign contracting in the name of and binding the state and
the citizens thereof by its approval of a treaty-that is not a legislative
act ;12 and second, legislatively speaking, it has passed a law which gives
notice to the citizens of the state of their rights thereunder and the ob-
ligations and duties imposed upon them and assumed thereby. In the
latter capacity, the legislature performs according to its delegated
9 See footnotes 4 and 8.
:
0 WHATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th Eng. ed.) 73, 74.
11 Thus, after ratification, the compact becomes a contract between the states so
that none can thereafter pass laws impairing the obligations thereof, or mak-
ing less valid and secure the rights secured thereunder. For cases construing
compacts between states under the Articles of Confederation see Marlatt v.
Silk and M'Donald, 11 Pet. 1, 9 L.ed. 609 (1837) ; Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S.
155, 14 Sup. Ct. 783, 38 L.ed. 669 (1894) ; Sim's Lessee v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425,
1 L.ed. 665 (1799). For cases considering compacts entered into subsequent
to 1789, see Poole et al. v. Lessee of John Fleeger et al., 11 Pet. 185, 9 L.ed.
680 (1837) ; Green et al. v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L.ed. 547 (1823) ; Virginia v.
West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39, 20 L.ed. 67 (1871); Report of Committee on Inter-
state Compacts to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, August, 1921, p. 39.
12 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L.ed. 415, 435 (1829), in which Justice
Marshall stated, "A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not
a legislative ace * * *." See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.ed. 25
(1831) in which Thompson, J., dissenting, said, at page 60, "What is a treaty as
understood in the law of nations? It is an agreement or contract between two
or more nations or sovereigns, entered into by agents appointed for that pur-
pose, and duly sanctioned by the supreme power of the respective parties."
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powers as found in the constitution of the state, but one will search in
vain for a delegation of power in any state constitution granting to a
legislature authority to make treaties in the name of the state.
The Constitution of Wisconsin is silent upon the subject, but in the
past twenty-five years the legislature has bound the state and its citizens
by at least two treaties with neighboring states.1 3 In none of the six
ratifying states signatory to the Colorado River Compact is constitu-
tional authority to be found vesting in their respective legislatures
power to enter into so far-reaching an agreement binding for all time
upon the states and their citizens.
Notwithstanding lack of constitutional authority in the state legis-
latures, no compact between the states has ever been successfully ques-
tioned upon that ground. In fact there has been universal acceptance
by the courts of their authority as the recognized and appropriate
source of power. 14 Custom has established, and acquiescence for one
hundred and fifty years has confirmed the right.15 To deny it would be
to reject an unchartered power as thoroughly established in the political
departments of our state governments as the common law is in our
jurisprudence.
The treaty-making power of the United States of America is vested
by the Constitution in the President of the United States acting "by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, * * *, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur" 16 and "all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary not-
withstanding."' 7 No such provisions appear in the state constitutions.
The legislatures ordinarily initiate and always ratify compacts. Under
the Federal Constitution the House of Representatives has no part in
treaty making unless by the terms of a treaty legislative action by Con-
gress is required to make it effective or to fulfill its provisions.
'3 Wis. Laws (1917) c. 64, p. 171; WIS. STAT. (1927) c. 87.
14See notes 4, 5, 8, supra.
is VATTEL, op. cit. supra § 154, "Notwithstanding our assertion above, that pub-
lic treaties are made only by the superior, powers, treaties of that nature may
nevertheless be entered int, by princes or communities, who have a right to
contract them, either by the concession of the sovereign, or by the fundamental
laws of the state, by particular reservations, or by custom. Thus, the princes
and free cities of Germany, though dependant on the emperor and the empire,
have the right of forming alliances with foreign powers. The constitutions of
the empire give them, in this as in many other respects, the rights of sov-
ereignty. Some cities of Switzerland, though subject to a prince, have made
alliances with the cantons; the permission or toleration of the sovereign has
given birth to such treaties, and long custom has established the right to con-
tract them." (Present writer's italics.)
16 U. S. CONST. Art. II, § 2.
" U. S. CoNST. Art. VI, clause 2.
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Since the power to make treaties or compacts is not by the constitu-
tions of the states reposed in the governor, and by common consent and
ancient custom has been conceded to be in the legislature, an interesting
question arises as to whether the veto power lodged in the governor
could be exercised to defeat the treaty by a veto of the ratifying act.
The limits of this paper do not permit of discussion of the point, and
we will assume for our purposes that there is agreement between the
chief executive and the legislature of the ratifying state upon the com-
pact.
A treaty of the United States is made a legislative act and becomes
the law of the land by force of the ConstitutionYa A treaty ratified by
state legislatures becomes a contract between states and the law of the
states by force of the acts of ratification.
RESPONSIBILITY IN TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Under our system of government, there can be no action by Con-
gress constitutionally beyond the delegated and implied powers of that
body, and conversely there can be no exercise of their police
powers by the states which usurps federal authority in any field consti-
tutionally occupied by that authority. It is obvious, then, than nation-
wide and regional commercial, industrial and social reforms cannot be
completely effected without a juncture of power and a combination of
all agencies, federal and state, devoted to the common purpose. A
fusion of all power and means to the end becomes, therefore, not only
desirable but imperative. The responsibility is more that of the states
than of the federal government. Through the compact clause, the power
to initiate lies with the former, the duty to cooperate with the latter.
Full recognition and a complete understanding of these basic obliga-
tions must be widespread and consciously present in every effort.
The National Industrial Recovery Act was foredoomed to failure
not only because of the apparent conflict with the Constitution, but be-
cause the authors of it conceived their plan in disregard of the position
which the states must occupy in labor and industrial reforms. The legis-
lation which the state legislatures in many instances enacted to supple-
ment the N. I. R. A. was fundamentally dishonest, because it amounted
to a surrender to the United States of that measure of home rule which
the people had declared in the Constitution should remain in the states.
Hours of labor, the minimum wage, conditions surrounding employ-
ment, and what constitutes unfair practices in competitive business, are
frequently regional problems; quite often one may be of major im-
portance in an industry limited to a comparatively few states, and in
37a U. S. CONsT. Art. VI, clause 2.
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no instance is it likely that blanket restrictions covering the entire
country would be just to every section. Lack of familiarity with or dis-
regard of actual .facts has caused theory to supplant common sense;
fanaticism over-rides considerations of justice. The minimum wage
which one industry might support will ruin another, and throw thous-
ands of willing workers out of employment. Child labor on the farm is
quite a different thing from child labor in the factory and under-
ground. Intensive labor of an exacting character requires limitation on
number of hours in one industry, whereas, in another the same limita-
tion would be unfair to employer and employee. And finally, considera-
tions of sex and of age present definite problems in labor legislation.
The states have passed a bewildering variety of laws on the subjects
mentioned.' 8 The study of them discloses a conflict of motives which
combine economic orthodoxy with humanitarian idealism without much
direction. It is plain that the state legislator cannot think in terms of
reforms in labor conditions which are translatable directly into in-
creased costs and reduced production as compared with costs and pro-
duction in a competitive state, and at the same time reach very lofty
heights in legislation for the relief of the oppressed in industry. Reform
at the cost of economic ruin for his state is a weighty responsibility
for him to assume. Nevertheless, there has been steady progress and
public opinion has been recorded upon the statute books of many of
the states in the form of enlightened legislation. But the point is that
there is a lack of uniformity which results in unmerited disadvantage
to one state and an unfair advantage ,to another. If progress is to pro-
ceed in an orderly fashion, resort must be had to interstate agreements
in which uniformity can be measurably attained in regions where like
conditions prevail, or in industries where competitive conditions can be
brought into substantial accord with justice to all. Assuming that the
desirability of that approach will be conceded, the question of the most
effective mode of making the compact useful becomes of next im-
portance.
SOME SUGGESTIONS
I.
AN INTERSTATE LABOR RELATIONS COMPACT
The National Industrial Recovery Act is no more, but the Congress
has passed the "National Labor Relations Act"' 9 which if sustained as
constitutional will result in the regulation of intrastate industries by the
"National Labor Relations Board" created by it. However, constitu-
18 See tabulations in first (January 1934) and third (January 1935) Reports to
the General Court of Massachusetts of the Commission on Interstate Compacts
Affecting. Labor and Industries.
19 P. L. No. 198, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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tional objections to it could be urged upon the same grounds which
caused the Supreme Court to unanimously declare the N. I. R. A.
offensive to American institutions as established by the Constitution.
It is not the purpose of this paper to attack the Act on that score, but
instead to demonstrate that these repeated efforts by Congress to en-
croach upon the reserved powers of the state should be met by an as-
sertion of state sovereignty through the medium of interstate compacts.
Experience has taught us during the past three years that the repre-
sentatives of the states in Congress will not, when subject to powerful
executive pressure, protect the states from such attacks. The states,
then, must assume the burden of their own defense.
By means of an interstate compact with the consent of Congress,
the sixteen leading industrial states which produce 82.5 per cent in
value of all of our manufactured products and employ about 80 per
cent of all persons gainfully occupied in manufactures 2 0 could unite to
establish an industrial labor relations board with all the powers neces-
sary to make its authority effective within those states and such other
states as might subsequently ratify.
Such a compact could be drawn to include every desirable provision
found in the National Labor Relations Act. As an interstate compact
it would be confined in its application to intrastate industry and com-
merce, but by the Act of Congress consenting, the compact could be
extended to interstate commerce. This would not be a surrender by
Congress of its power to regulate commerce between the states; it
would be an exercise of that power in that it would constitute a choice
of means which is a necessary incident to the power to regulate. 21 The
compact, should, of course, provide for federal representation and
should be left open for ratification by other states desiring to take ad-
vantage of its provisions.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, enforcement of the orders
and judgments of the Board is provided for by recourse to the Federal
District Courts or to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal and
their jurisdiction is enlarged for that purpose.22 The states could agree
upon the same procedure, assuming, of course, that the Congress in the
20 New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio (these four states produce 42.3 per
cent in value of the nations manufactures), Michigan, New Jersey, Massachu-
setts, California, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, Connecticut, Texas, North
Carolina, Minnesota and Maryland.
21 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.ed. 597 (1819) in which Chief Jus-
tice Marshall said, "The government which has a right to do an act and has
imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must according to the dictates
of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may
not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting the
object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establishing that
exception * * * "
22 p. L. No. 198, 7th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1935) § 9. (e), 9(f), 9(g), 9(h), 9(i).
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consenting act affirmatively conferred the necessary jurisdiction upon
those courts. Or the states could provide in their compact that the
courts of the state in which the person (including corporations) found
delinquent resides, or is doing business, or in which the unfair labor
practice in violation of the compact occurred, should have jurisdiction
of enforcement proceedings.
The membership of the Labor Board created by the Compact should
be limited to five and the Board should be given all the powers neces-
sary to an efficient administration of the duties imposed upon it. The
commissioners should be named initially in the Compact for terms of
two, four, six, eight and ten years, respectively, and thereafter should
be appointed by the governors of the ratifying states acting jointly,
either to fill vacancies for an unexpired term, or for ten years where
the incumbent has served his term. In case the governors could not
agree, then the selection should be decided by their vote, the majority
controlling.
The Board should be paid adequate salaries and provided with
ample funds with power to use state agencies whenever available. The
costs of administration should not be fixed in the compact, and after the
first year should depend upon a budget furnished by the Board by
January first of each calendar year and pro rated amongst the ratify-
ing states according to the number of cases heard by the Board origi-
nating in each state during the preceding year. For the first year the
amount would have to be arbitrarily fixed and proration settled by
agreement. The ratifying states would pledge themselves in the Com-
pact to pay their share just as any nation would do in the case of an
arbitration treaty or a claims convention. If extended by Congress to
interstate commerce, the United States would contribute on the same
basis as the states.
The concentration of employment in wholesale establishments, in
the production of minerals in the mineral producing states, in trans-
portation intrastate, and in intrastate commerce generally for the six-
teen leading industrial states corresponds roughly with the percentage
given for them in manufactures. If four leading mineral producing
states not included are added, the percentage of the persons employed
in industry, commerce and the production of minerals in the United
States included within the twenty states would exceed eighty-five per
cent. Thus, an agreement between twenty states establishing an inter-
state labor relations board could afford substantially the same measure
of relief to labor and employer proposed to be given by the National
Labor Relations Act.
If that is not considered to be of sufficient weight to turn the scales
in favor of an interstate compact, then there can be added on the side
[Vol. 20
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of state action as opposed to legislation by Congress, the ponderable
fact that the former accords with the plan of the Constitution as re-
gards division of powers, whereas, the latter is not only antagonistic
to that plan but proposes to do by indirection that which is prohibited
to Congress by inescapable implications, if not expressly.
23
II.
UNIFORM STANDARDS OF LABOR
In dealing with the minimum wage and maximum hours by inter-
state compacts the states have constitutional limitations, both state and
federal, to consider.2 4 However, if the purpose of the compact, actual,
as well as expressed, should be to banish conditions oppressive to labor
such as hours of work so long as to promote inefficiency and stifle
intelligence, or a wage so low as to induce standards of living noxious
to morals and bodily vigor, it would probably be sustained as not in
conflict with constitutional guarantees of "liberty of person and free-
dom of contract.' 2 - The police powers of the states exercised jointly to
effect a joint purpose for the public good would not be set aside by the
courts unless it was apparent from the compact that the primary pur-
pose was to restrict freedom of contract rather than to promote the
public welfare.
2 6
III.
CHILD LABOR COMPACT
The proposed child labor amendment to the Federal Constitution
delegates to the Congress unlimited power over the labor of persons
under eighteen years of age. It is not a question of whether so vast a
power over child, home, and possibly school, would be wisely used by
the Congress, but rather whether jurisdiction and control over our
youth should be transferred from the states and homes wherein they
live to a great bureau in Washington. It is a choice between remote
control by an agency which will seek to regiment childhood, just as
23 U. S. CoNST. Amend. X.
24 U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct.
277, 52 L.ed. 436 (1908) ; Coppage v. The State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup.
Ct. 240, 59 L.ed. 441 (1914); Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct.
539, 49 L.ed. 537 (1905) ; Donham v. West Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657, 47
Sup. Ct. 343, 71 L.ed. 825 (1927) ; see Adkins et al. v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.ed. 785 (1923). For a state limitation see
N. M. CoNsT. art. II § 18, construed in State v. Henry, 37 N.M. 536, 25 P. (2d)
204 (1933).
25 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L.ed. 830 (1917); see
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52,L.ed. 551 (1908).
26 A conclusion drawn from Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435,
61 L.ed. 830 (1917).
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similar agencies have sought to regiment adult activities, and home con-
trol by parents and the legislatures of the states.
Since 1910 state laws have eliminated child labor as a material fac-
tor in competitive industries. In 1930 the number employed in factories
under sixteen years was negligible. In view of the progress made it is
fair to assume that the Census of 1940 will show that there is no prob-
lem of child labor in industry.
An interstate compact, however, would furnish greater uniformity.
An agreement uppn a basic sine qua non, say sixteen years, as an age
under which no child shall be allowed to work in factories of any sort,
in mines or mining operations of any character, in building trades, or in
wholesale or retail establishments, leaving the state legislatures power
to regulate employment of minors of and above that age or those en-
gaged in other occupations, would meet essential requirements. The
adoption of the compact would give the desired uniformity since the
ratifying act in each state would repeal all acts in conflict therewith.
Enforcement could safely be left to the states, all of which have the
machinery already established for such enforcement. Every state in
the Union today has a child labor law. If such a compact as that sug-
gested were ratified by the ten leading industrial states, public opinion
in all the states would lead to a speedy ratification by all. Agitation
for a child labor amendment to the Constitution would cease for lack
of an appealing argument.
CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS
The suggestions as to the uses of interstate compacts made above
will not be popular with the evangelists preaching the gospel of central-
ization of all authority over industry and labor in the federal govern-
ment. It can be expected that anyone advocating the extension of state
sovereignty by interstate compacts over matters affecting industry and
labor will be attacked with much fervor.2 7
The first assault will be upon the capacity of the states to agree.
It will be urged that there will not be vision reaching beyond the limits
of a state sufficient to overcome purely material and economic rivalries
and selfishness and bring about interstate agreements upon such ques-
tions as child labor, the minimum wage and maximum hours, labor re-
lations with industry, establishing code authorities, and social reforms
regional in character.
27 George Soule, Back to States' Rights, HARPERS MAGAZINE, September 1935.
The author omits to present the factLthat since 1789 there have been not less
than fifty-eight interstate compacts ratified by state legislatures and consented
to by Congress, and thirteen so ratified without that consent. He fails to men-
tion the outstanding examples of the Colorado River Compact, the New York-
New Jersey Compact creating the "Port of New York Authority," and others.
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History does not support the objection. As early as 1789, Virginia
and Kentucky settled by compact, rights and interests in lands severed
from Virginia and jurisdiction over the Ohio River.28 In 1834 New
York and New Jersey entered into a treaty determining their boundary
line in New York harbor and agreeing upon jurisdiction.29 For over one
hundred years they have lived in peace and harmony, under that agree-
ment. More recently (1921-1922) they have agreed upon joint develop-
ment of New York Harbor by a joint commission given broad
powers.2 Concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River has been
assented to by Oregon and Washington and the protection of fish pro-
vided for by interstate compact.31 Wisconsin and Minnesota have made
mutual cessions of territory and adjusted their boundary line accord-
ingly.2 2
By the Colorado River Compact apportionment of the waters in
perpetuity of the "Nile of the Southwest" was agreed upon by six out
of the seven states of the river basin. 2 This compact made possible the
construction of the greatest dam and impounding project in the world.
There could be no more controversial question, nor one more vital to
the present and future development of the arid and semi-arid states
of the west, than the division of the waters of their rivers and streams.
And yet since 1922 five such compacts have been ratified by state legis-
latures.In all, sice 1789, there have been not less than fifty eight interstate
compacts ratified by state legislatures and consented to by Congress and
thirteen so ratified without that consent.
In the light of that factual presentation of statesmanship and lead-
ership, doubts concerning the present reality of those qualities in state
administration are apparitions and not substantial in truth. They may
obscure the light of history, but they cannot extinguish it.
28 13 Hening, VA. STAT. at L. 17, 19; Ky. CONST. art. VIII, § 7; 1 LITT. Ky.
LAWS 32; 1 STAT. 189 (1791) ; Green et al. v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L.ed. 547
(1823) ; Hawkins et al. v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 8 L.ed. 190 (1831).
29N. Y. Laws 1834, c. 8, p. 8; N. J. Laws 1834-35, 118; 4 STAT. 708-11, c. 105
(1834).
30Treaty between New York and New Jersey creating "Port of New York
Authority." N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 43, p. 61; N. J. Laws 1921, c. 151, p. 412;
N. J. Laws 1922, c. 9, p. 25; 42 STAT. 174, 180, c. 77 (1921); 42 STAT. 822,
826, c. 277 (1922) ; see City of New York v. Willcox et al., 115 Misc. Rep.
351, 189 N.Y. Supp. 724 (1921).
31 Or. Gen. Laws 1915, c. 188, § 29; Wash. Laws 1915, c. 31, § 116; 40 STAT. 515,
c. 47 (1918).
32 Wis. Laws 1917, c. 64, p. 171; Minn. Laws 1917, c. 116, p. 142; 40 STAT. 959,
c. 172 (1918).
32Cal. Laws c. 1 1929; Colo. Laws (1925), c. 177; Nev. Laws 1925, c. 96;
N. M. Laws 1925, c. 78; Utah Laws 1929, c. 31; Wyo. Laws 1925, c. 92; 45
STAT. 1057-1066, c. 42 (1928) ; see Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 51
Sup. Ct. 522, 75 L.ed. 1154 (1931).
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And then we encounter those who say that a state should not sur-
render its sovereignty and in fact cannot do so by an interstate compact.
Cession of territory is a complete relinquishment of sovereignty and
yet it has been repeatedly done by interstate compact, and the power
to do so has never been successfully questioned. Joint control over the
development of resources in more than one state has been vested in a
joint commission established by interstate agreement for that purpose
as in the case of "Port of New York Authority." California has agreed
with the United States to a limitation of the use by the state of the
water of the Colorado River, such limitation to accrue for the benefit
of the six other basin states. 34 The historic case of surrender of sover-
eignty by the state is, of course, the Articles of Confederation.
We have already observed that compacts between the states are to
be construed in the light of public law, the law of nations. There is no
question but that sovereign nations may divest themselves of sovereign-
ty provided the intention is plainly expressed in their treaties.35
The sovereignty bugaboo is an excuse for evasion of a plain
responsibility resting upon the states; it is not a valid reason for
denial of the right of the states to assume and efficiently discharge
their responsibilities through the medium of interstate compacts.
Again it will be said that what a state legislature has enacted
a succeeding one may repeal.36 This objection overlooks two con-
siderations attaching to interstate compacts, first, the ratification
of a treaty between the staes is not a legislative act, but an act by
the sovereign of the state with power to bind the state and its citi-
zens by a contract with another state, or more than one state; and,
second, that such a contract, if it involved property rights in gen-
eral, would fall within the protection of the Federal Constitution
prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts." But we
may assume apart from purely technical reasons, that no state,
once good faith is pledged, would lightly treat so weighty a promise
as a solemn agreement to be bound by the stipulated provisions of
an interstate agreement. Moreover, recourse to history shows but
one such instance in one hundred and fifty years.3 8
34 Cal. Laws 1929, c. 16, p. 38; 45 STAT. 1057, c. 42 (1928).
35 TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc LAW (1901) § 385, in which the author says,
"As it will not be presumed that any state desires to divest itself of its sov-
ereignty, its property, or its right of self-preservation, no such result can be
established by implication. It must be clearly expressed."
36 See such cases as Newton v. Commissioner, 100 U.S. 548, 25 L.ed. 710 (1880)
and Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. 110, 36 L.ed.
1018 (1892).
37 See Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L.ed. 547 (1823).
38 See Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West irginia et al., 246 U.S. 565,
38 Sup. Ct. 400, 62 L.ed. 883 (1918) ; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39,
20 L.ed. 67 (1871).
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But as an answer to all objections, no better reply can be given
than the words written in connection with this subject of a beloved
preceptor of the law and the author of a monumental work on evi-
dence: "Common sense and world experience teach us to proceed
in practical matters to do the obviously wise thing, and not to let
ourselves be paralyzed by theoretical doubts."
39
CONCLUSION
Advocates of a constitutional amendment transferring from the
states to the federal government power to regulate all intrastate
industry and commerce, the relations of employer and employees
engaged therein, including the right to limit hours of labor, to estab-
lish maximum hours of work and generally to place in effect social
reforms, and those who oppose such a radical shift in our present
form of government, represent the north and south poles of philos-
ophies of government. Broadly speaking the change would spell
government by federal bureaucrats in place of our present system
of local self-government as exhibited by our states. In short the
state governments would administer affairs not as direct representa-
tives, but as the agents of remote officials not accountable for blunders
or errors, whom the people of the states would seldom know by name
and probably never see in person. Home rule by and for the home
people would take its place with the horse and buggy age, quite fittingly
since it was during that period that our ancestors fought for and em-
bedded the principle in our institutions.
But, say the advocates of change, you forget that the people
elect the Congress of the United States and that the Congress rep-
resents all the people. Such, indeed, is the theory of the Constitu-
tion, and such, certainly, was the intention of the authors of that
great instrument and of the people when they adopted it, but practice
during the past three years has fallen woefully short of theory
and intention. Surrender of its powers delegated to the Congress
by the people to bureaus or commissions and the attempted
delegation by Congress to bureaus and commissions of powers
which the people had reserved to the states, furnish proof of the
futility of the argument that the Congress is a dependable repre-
sentative of the people; it is so elected, but it has not so functioned.
The appalling growth of bureaucracy in our federal government re-
veals the impotency of Congress and the comparative ease with
which it can be manipulated to augment that growth.
The great obstacle to further expansion of bureaucracy is the
reserved powers of the states and the forty-eight state govern-
39 fDean Wigmore in "Report of the Committee on Interstate Compacts" to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, August, 1921,
p. 40.
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ments. Transfer those powers to the federal government and the
stage is set for the last appearance of representative government.
The question of "Why States ?" will be answered, but too late to
save the American people from an autocracy of bureaucrats and an
army of retainers maintained by the people's money furnished by
a complacent Congress whose most valued functions will then be
to pass appropriation bills and to invent ingenious way of separat-
ing the taxpayers from their earnings and savings to supply the
wherewithal until there are no more earnings or savings.
Centralization of government of the character proposed is not
government with the consent of the governed, nor yet government
by and for the people; it is government by a governing class for
that class. The conception is not remotely American in thought or
execution; instead it is distinctly European and Oriental in philos-
ophy and origin. The genesis of the reasoning is rooted in distrust
of the capacity of the governed to govern themselves; the belief
that a gifted few know better what is best for their lowly fellow
citizens than do that numerous category. Weighed by present Euro-
pean standards they are liberals, but when placed in the scales of
the bill of rights and the Declaration of Independence, they are
reactionaries.
By energetic action and by education of the people as to the
ultimate result of present trends, the states may recover the ground
which has been lost during the past few years. The assertion of
their sovereignty by interstate compacts will be a most effective
means to that end. Federal bureaucracy will be checked and there
will be a return to the sanity of balanced powers and of direct
responsibility to the people, the source of all authority under our
system of government.
Usurpation of powers reserved in the states and in the people
attempted by bold frontal attacks and by the far more dangerous
method of undermining by subtle indirection, will terminate when
every senator and representative in the Congress knows that when
he votes for measures intended to strike down the sovereignty of
the states, he will be held to strict accountability by an indignant
constituency. Public opinion is still the force which governs
America.4 0
40 For general reading on the subject see Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact
Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 685; Bruce, Co'mpacts and Agreements Between States (1919)
2 MINN. L. REv. 500; Wilson, Interstate Compacts under the Constitution. Past
Uses and Future Possibilities (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 734; Cohen, The New
York Harbor Problem and Its Legal Aspects (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 973; Wil-
liams, Interstate Compacts as a Means of Settling Disputes between States
(1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 322; Williams, The Power of the State to Make Com-
pacts (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 635; Wigmore, Uniformity of Law-Compacts be-
tween States (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 479.
